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Abstract: Are sexual orientations freely chosen? The idea that someone’s 
sexual orientation is not a choice is very influential in the mainstream LGBT 
political movement. But do we have good reasons to believe it is not a choice? 
Going against the orthodoxy, William Wilkerson has recently argued that 
sexual orientation is partly constituted by our interpretations of our own 
sexual desires, and we choose these interpretations, so sexual orientation is 
partly constituted by choice. In this paper I aim to examine the question of 
whether our interpretations of our own sexual desires are constitutive of our 
sexual orientations. I will argue that whereas Wilkerson’s argument for the 
claim that sexual orientations are in part constituted by our chosen interpre-
tations of our sexual desires is not sound, there are good reasons for endorsing 
a weaker claim, namely, that there are different but equally apt descriptions of 
the same sexual desires, depending on which concepts we have.
Keywords: Sexual orientation; Sexual desire; Choice; Self-knowledge; Concep-
tual schemes.
1  Introduction
Are sexual orientations freely chosen? The idea that someone’s sexual orienta-
tion is not a choice is very common in popular culture, and also very influential 
in the mainstream LGBT political movement.1 But do we have good reasons to 
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1 See Stein (2011) for a very nuanced discussion of the moral and political implications of this 
debate.
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believe it is not a choice? Wilkerson (2009, 2013) has recently argued that there 
are good reasons to believe that sexual orientation is partly constituted by choice. 
In this paper I would like to critically assess his main argument for this contro-
versial claim, and I will argue that although the considerations he offers fall short 
of establishing the conclusion that sexual orientations are in part constituted by 
interpretation and hence choice, there is an alternative view about the connec-
tions between sexual desires and interpretation that is more plausible. In par-
ticular, I will argue that there could be different but equally apt descriptions of 
the same sexual desires, depending on which concepts of sexual desires we have. 
Therefore, there is a sense in which our descriptions of our sexual desires (but not 
the sexual desires themselves) depend on how we interpret them, that is to say, 
on which concepts of sexual orientation are more relevant or more salient to us.
2   Wilkerson’s Master Argument
Wilkerson (2009) follows the standard distinction between sexual orientation and 
sexual identity. He characterizes sexual orientation as “an enduring, fairly stable 
desire oriented toward a particular gender” (Wilkerson 2009, p. 97), whereas sexual 
identity is “a self-consciously directed project that a person develops around this 
orientation” (Wilkerson 2009, p. 97). To simplify, we can characterize sexual identity 
as having certain beliefs about one’s sexual orientation, and perhaps also identify-
ing with a certain cultural community (in the sense of belonging to the commu-
nity, or perhaps merely believing or desiring that one belongs to it), whereas sexual 
orientation does not require such beliefs or membership. I will assume, following 
Wilkerson, that sexual orientation is a matter of sexual desires oriented toward 
particular genders (and/or sexes), although I will remain neutral on whether the 
sexual desires constituting sexual orientation have to be enduring or not.2
Our topic here is sexual orientation itself, not sexual identity. Wilkerson’s 
main argument for the claim that sexual orientations can be chosen goes as 
follows:
2 See Stein (1999), Wilkerson (2013) and Díaz-León (forthcoming) for further elaboration and 
defence of the view that sexual orientation is a matter of sexual desires. For an alternative view 
in terms of dispositions to engage in sexual behavior, rather than desires, see Dembroff (2016). 
Wilkerson (2013) argues that sexual orientations (according to the ordinary conception) do not 
exist since many people do not have enduring, stable desires toward a particular gender. I am 
sympathetic to this worry, but it could be argued that a more minimal conception of sexual ori-
entation that does not require that sexual desires are enduring and stable does not have to be 
empty, even if many people do not have enduring desires.
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1. Sexual orientation as an enduring desire is partially constituted by interpre-
tation within context.
2. Interpretation requires choice.
3. Hence, sexual orientation is partly constituted by choice. (Wilkerson 2009, 
p. 100)
In this paper I want to focus on premise (1).3 According to Wilkerson, the main 
idea behind this premise is that interpreting desires is not just a matter of forming 
a belief about a pre-existing desire; rather, interpreting a desire requires that we 
group together some inchoate and ambiguous desires, and by grouping them 
together we somehow develop them and transform their nature. Therefore, our 
desires constitutively depend on our interpretations of them.
Wilkerson offers two arguments for this central premise, namely, what he calls 
the “indirect” argument and the “direct” argument. I will critically examine them in 
turn in the following two sections. In Section 4 I will also introduce an alternative, 
weaker view about the relation between desires and interpretation, according to 
which our desires themselves are not constituted by our interpretations, but we can 
still claim that the descriptions of our sexual desires that are the most appropriate 
can vary from context to context, depending on which concepts of sexual desires 
and sexual orientation are the most relevant or salient in each context. In Section 5 
I will defend my alternative view from a possible objection, and I will conclude that 
this weaker view is preferable to Wilkerson’s stronger view.
3   The Indirect Argument: How Can We Know About 
Our Own Sexual Orientations?
The indirect argument starts by assuming the negation of Wilkerson’s conclu-
sion, namely, that sexual desires are not constituted by interpretation, and then 
it argues that some absurd or problematic consequence would follow, so that we 
have some indirect reasons for thinking that sexual desire does require interpre-
tation. In particular, Wilkerson argues that if sexual desires were not (at least 
partially) constituted by interpretation, then it would be difficult to understand 
how we come to know our sexual desires in the way we do, and more in particu-
lar, how we can be wrong or deceived about our own sexual desires. Therefore, 
the view that sexual desires are partially constituted by interpretation provides a 
good explanation of how we come to know our sexual desires.
3 See Ayala (2017) for an interesting critique of premise (2).
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More in particular, Wilkerson argues that if knowing my desires requires no 
interpretation of the desires, then desires must be self-intimating (i.e. they can be 
known automatically, without having to do any work), and also self-evident (i.e. 
we cannot be mistaken about them). But, Wilkerson argues, desires are neither 
self-intimating nor self-evident. Then, we can conclude that knowing my desires 
requires interpretation.
The conclusion of the indirect argument might seem to be an epistemic rather 
than a metaphysical claim, that is, it seems to be a claim about how we can come 
to know about our desires, rather than about the nature of our desires. But as 
Wilkerson explains, he is drawing a genuinely metaphysical conclusion from 
epistemic premises. That is, he wants to argue that sexual orientations are very 
likely to be constituted by our interpretations of them (a metaphysical claim), 
given the way we come to know them, that is, given that their nature is not trans-
parent to us and we can therefore be wrong about them (an epistemic claim).
Wilkerson does acknowledge the fact that the indirect argument only gives 
(at most) inductive, fallible evidence for the metaphysical claim. In his view, 
there are other independent, more direct arguments for the metaphysical claim. I 
will first examine the indirect argument in the remainder of this section, and then 
I will focus on the direct argument for the metaphysical conclusion in Section 4.
As we have seen, Wilkerson’s strategy is as follows: in order to reach the con-
clusion that our desires are constituted by interpretation, he argues that if inter-
pretation was not required, then our desires would be self-evident, but desires 
cannot be self-evident because we can be wrong about them, so interpretation 
must be constitutive of our desires. The claim about the possibility of error is 
especially clear when it comes to sexual desires, because many people report 
that they have been mistaken or self-deceived about their own sexual desires. 
And it seems clear that if we can be self-deceived or mistaken about our own 
sexual desires, then sexual desires are not self-evident. So far so good. But Wilk-
erson adds the following, more controversial claim: if knowing our desires did 
not require that they are constituted by interpretation, then they would somehow 
be given to us in experience, and if so, Wilkerson wonders, “why would a person 
not simply see that her feelings were homosexual, and that she should adopt a 
homosexual identity?” (Wilkerson 2009, p. 103). That is to say, if our desires are 
not constituted by interpretation, then we would be able to discover the nature 
and meaning of our sexual desires in a direct, straightforward manner, but this 
does not seem to capture the way many people come to know their sexual ori-
entation. Therefore, he argues, this gives us some evidence for the claim that 
coming to know our sexual desire requires that they are constituted (in part) by 
interpretation, or in other words, sexual desires are not fully formed until they 
are interpreted.
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In response: I agree that sexual desires, and other desires, do not have to be self-
evident. But this does not entail that they are constituted by interpretation. In par-
ticular, I want to argue that there is an alternative account of how we come to know 
our sexual desires that can do justice to the claim that we can be wrong about them, 
without being committed to the stronger claim that those desires are partially consti-
tuted by interpretation. More in particular, I think it is possible to deny that desires 
are self-evident, but accept that they are self-intimating (as opposed to Wilkerson, 
who claims that if desires are not self-evident, then they cannot be self-intimating 
either). For a desire (or a mental state in general) could be self- intimating in the 
sense that it does not take much work to grasp it, that is, someone can know that 
she has that mental state just in virtue of undergoing it, but at the same time such 
mental state might fail to be self-evident if for example we come to know about it by 
means of some reliable (and sort of direct and effortless) mechanism that typically 
produces true beliefs about it, but could occasionally produce false beliefs. In this 
way, we can have mental states that are self-intimating but not self-evident, since 
our knowledge of them is automatic and effortless, but not infallible.
This gives rise to an interesting question: how is it possible to be wrong 
about our sexual desires sometimes, if we can apprehend them in such a direct 
manner? In my view, we should distinguish between our knowledge of occurring 
mental states (that is, conscious mental states that appear in the stream of con-
sciousness), which can be known by means of introspection, so they are self-
intimating (but not self-evident), and our knowledge of dispositional or standing 
mental states, which are not always manifested, and only occasionally enter into 
the stream of consciousness, and therefore we cannot always introspect them. 
It seems clear that dispositional mental states are not self-intimating, since it 
does take some work to come to know them, but in my view there are alterna-
tive ways of explaining how we come to know about dispositional mental states, 
without having to endorse  Wilkerson’s claim that they are partly constituted by 
our interpretations. In particular, we could appeal to a general “inference to the 
best explanation” mechanism, which may involve a combination of introspective 
knowledge, knowledge of our own behaviour, and other forms of inductive knowl-
edge. In this way, coming to know dispositional mental states would require some 
work and therefore those mental states would not be self-intimating, as opposed 
to occurring, episodic conscious mental states that can be apprehended much 
more directly and straightforwardly by means of introspection, and are therefore 
self-intimating.
This account seems plausible enough, but if we accept it then we do not have 
good reasons to accept Wilkerson’s account of coming to know our desires by 
means of interpretations that somehow determine their nature. That is, if we 
accept the view according to which we come to know occurring mental states in 
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a self-intimating but not self-evident way, and we come to know dispositional 
mental states in a way that is neither self-evident nor self-intimating, then we 
do not have any good reasons to deny the claim that coming to know our desires 
is a matter of forming beliefs about states whose nature is determined prior to 
forming those beliefs, that is, without the need for interpretation, contra Wilker-
son’s indirect argument.
To sum up my line of reasoning in this section: my main point here is just that 
the indirect argument does not suffice to motivate Wilkerson’s claim that sexual 
desires are constituted by interpretation. In particular, the claim that sexual 
desires are not self-evident does not suffice to establish the claim that our ways of 
coming to know our desires requires that they are constituted by interpretation, 
since there are other accounts of self-knowledge that are also compatible with the 
possibility of error, without having to endorse the need of interpretative work. 
Moreover, we can agree with Wilkerson that dispositional mental states such as 
desires are probably not self-intimating (because some work is needed in order to 
grasp them), but again this does not necessarily entail that our sexual desires are 
constituted by interpretation.
4   The Direct Argument: The Constitution 
of Desires
Wilkerson agrees that the indirect argument gives at most some fallible evidence 
for the claim that sexual desire is partially constituted by interpretation. But he 
argues that this initial evidence, plus some independent arguments having to 
do with the open nature of experiences and desires, are sufficient to motivate 
his metaphysical claim, namely, that the way we conceptualize and classify our 
desires and experiences changes and partially determines those experiences.
He says that the direct argument “argues that no experience is self-intimating 
or self-evident and so desire cannot be self-intimating or self-evident” (Wilkerson 
2009, p. 103). First of all, I would like to point out that experience and desire are 
in principle different kinds of mental states, so what applies to experiences might 
not apply to desires and vice versa. Experiences are supposed to be occurring, 
phenomenally conscious mental states that appear in the stream of conscious-
ness, whereas desires are supposed to be propositional attitudes, arguably of a 
dispositional character, which are not necessarily manifested in the form of either 
behavior or phenomenally conscious mental states. We can therefore distinguish 
between standing, dispositional desires that are not always manifested, and their 
manifestations in the form of episodic feelings or experiences that enter into the 
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stream of consciousness. That is to say, (standing) sexual desires can give rise to 
episodic feelings or experiences of attraction or arousal, which are indeed con-
scious. But still, the former are different from the latter. I agree that dispositional 
mental states are neither self-evident nor self-intimating, since it takes work to 
grasp them and we could be mistaken about them, but I am sympathetic to the 
view that conscious mental states are self-intimating, even if we can sometimes 
be mistaken about them, when the direct and reliable but fallible mechanisms 
that produce beliefs about our phenomenal states fail for some reason. Therefore, 
we need an alternative way of formulating Wilkerson’s metaphysical conclusion, 
so that it is related to the view that sexual desires themselves (rather than experi-
ences) are constituted by interpretations.
Wilkerson also says that “the idea of self-intimating and self-evident experi-
ence requires that any particular experience, feeling, desire or sensation requires 
no relation to anything outside it, for then it could be neither self-intimating nor 
self-evident” (Wilkerson 2009, p. 103). This claim is about self-intimating experi-
ences and self-intimating desires: we can understand the latter as the conscious 
manifestations of (dispositional) desires, which can indeed be self-intimating. 
Wilkerson’s point seems to be that if a mental state is self-intimating, then it is 
going to be a non-relational or intrinsic mental state (that is, a mental state that 
requires no relation to anything outside of it in order to be instantiated), or con-
versely, if it is relational (that is, it requires a relation to something outside of 
it in order to be instantiated), then it cannot be self-intimating. However, this 
inference seems too quick: in my view we could provide a plausible account of 
the nature of experiences and desires according to which they can be both self-
intimating and relational mental states. That is to say, accepting that they are 
self-intimating does not entail that they are not relational, as Wilkerson suggests. 
For instance, a functionalist account of the nature of experience can hold that 
experiences are self-intimating, to the extent that functionalism can explain our 
knowledge of experiences in terms of direct and reliable but fallible mechanisms 
(such as introspection), but functional states are clearly relational, so being self-
intimating does not entail being non-relational.
Therefore, the crucial idea of Wilkerson’s account cannot be just that sexual 
desires are relational, or that they are neither self-evident nor self-intimating, 
since many other views about the nature of desires can also accept those claims. 
What is distinctive about his account is the idea that sexual desires are not fully 
formed prior to our interpretations about them, and more in particular, that 
sexual desires are partially constituted by our interpretations of them. So, what 
arguments could be offered in support of this view, given that the plausible claim 
that sexual desires are relational and neither self-evident nor self-intimating is 
not sufficient to establish it?
Brought to you by | Universitat de Barcelona
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/6/17 1:02 PM
238      E. Díaz-León
First, Wilkerson appeals to a “Gestaltist” account of the nature of experience, 
as opposed to an atomistic one. As he recognizes, this is part of a larger, contro-
versial discussion. What I want to emphasize here is that we can accept some of 
his claims about the nature of feelings and experiences (such as being relational, 
and not self-evident) without having to accept that they are always indeterminate 
and open to interpretation.
In order to provide additional support for his view, Wilkerson also appeals 
to familiar narratives about the experience of coming out, such as the following:
In the situation under consideration, various sexual feelings lack determinate meaning or 
structure: they are constituents of a frightening, ambiguous situation awaiting some kind of 
resolution. Am I gay? Am I straight? Do I just have strong feelings for my same-sex friends? 
[...] Should I put one set of feelings and desires together, actually face the fact of their recur-
rence, and see them as belonging with other experiences? Or should I group them differ-
ently, separate them, find other deep explanations for my experiences? To what extent do 
the roles available in society fit with my own understanding of my experiences? (Wilkerson 
2009, p. 105)
In my view, these remarks seem to vividly capture the phenomenology of coming 
to know one’s sexual orientation, especially in cases of non-normative sexual ori-
entations (or at least they do so in my own case), but they do not yet establish the 
metaphysical claim that Wilkerson wants to defend, namely, that our desires are 
not merely “given” and are not fully developed until we choose to group them in 
one way rather than another (out of several possibilities that are open to us), and 
only then do they become fully determinate.
My main worry, in a nutshell, is that his account about the nature of feelings 
and desires seems too strong: it is not clear why we should accept that our acts of 
classifying and labeling our desires and experiences will change and transform 
their nature in the way Wilkerson describes. Of course, he is right that there are 
many different and mutually incompatible ways of classifying a certain system 
of experiences and desires, and there might be no unique classification that is 
clearly superior to the rest.4 But this is a claim about the availability of different 
conceptual schemes or systems of classification to conceptualize or classify the 
same phenomena, and this plausible claim does not entail the stronger, more 
4 They are incompatible in the sense that they provide different answers to questions such as 
“how many mental states are there?”, or “is this mental state more similar to this one or that 
one?”. But it could be argued that these different descriptions are compatible in the sense that 
they could all be true at the same time, since they involve different concepts and therefore yield 
different propositions that are compatible with each other. That is, there is no single proposition 
that one conceptual system endorses and the other denies. Since they employ different concepts, 
they do not have contradictory propositions.
Brought to you by | Universitat de Barcelona
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/6/17 1:02 PM
Sexual Orientation as Interpretation?      239
controversial claim that the very nature of those desires is not yet determinate 
prior to our acts of classifying and labeling them. For instance, he says:
[R]ecognizing certain desires, feelings, fantasies, and so forth, as both recurring and 
belonging to the same underlying feature of my personality requires an act of interpreta-
tion, because even my ability to reidentify them as recurring and as belonging together is 
partially determined by the framework within which I experience them. For this reason, the 
individual, recurring desires change, because they are grouped together into a new context, 
and my self-understanding changes as I conceive of myself as a particular kind of a person 
with a particular trait. (Wilkerson 2009, p. 101)
In response to this: I agree that when it comes to recurring instances of an experi-
ence, there are different ways of grouping and classifying them, since any token 
experience instantiates more than one type of phenomenal state. For instance, 
a token of a blue experience will instantiate the type ‘blue experience’ but also 
‘dark blue experience,’ ‘color experience,’ ‘visual experience,’ ‘experience I have 
in the evening,’ and so on. Therefore, there are many different ways of grouping 
together and classifying the many tokens of experiences that appear in my stream 
of consciousness: we might choose to focus on the more fine-grained types such 
as ‘dark blue’ vs. ‘light blue experience’, so that when we have recurring experi-
ences of seeing something light blue, we will group them together (that is, we will 
conceptualize them as falling under that same concept), but when we have an 
experience of something dark blue, this will not be grouped together with the light 
blue experiences, but will rather fall under a different concept. Or alternatively, 
we might be interested in grouping all blue experiences together, under the more 
coarse-grained concept ‘blue experience,’ or even ‘color experience.’ Hence, the 
way we classify our experiences depends on the different concepts that we might 
choose. But this does not entail that those experiences were not fully formed prior 
to our conceptualizing them in this or that way, since those experiences already 
had those properties (both being a blue experience and a light blue experience, 
say), prior to my application of these phenomenal concepts. So, I agree that there 
is a sense in which in order to recognize my experiences, I need to apply concepts 
to them, and there is an element of interpretation and choice in this process. But 
this does not entail Wilkerson’s stronger claim to the effect that the nature of the 
experience is determined through the process of choosing and applying a concept 
rather than another.
Likewise, there are different ways of conceptualizing our sexual desires and 
experiences of sexual attraction. All these mental states instantiate many mental 
properties, and we could focus on the more fine-grained or the more coarse-
grained properties. For instance, if I am experiencing sexual attraction towards 
some women, I could focus on what these mental states have in common with 
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other mental states that I also have, such as romantic feelings towards my close 
friends. Or I could focus on some other features of such sexual desires that they do 
not share with those feelings towards my close friends. Using different concepts 
to pick out these different features will likely have an impact in the significance 
that these mental states have for me, and how I self-identify. In my view this claim 
can capture the intuitions behind Wilkerson’s remarks about the phenomenology 
of coming out, without establishing the stronger view that our desires and experi-
ences are not fully determined until we interpret them.
Wilkerson also argues that applying one concept to our experiences rather 
than another can change the way the experience feels. For instance, he says:
Placing these experiences together under a single label and thinking of them as a single 
aspect changes their context and hence changes them. Even seeing certain desires, feelings 
or fantasies as recurring instances of the same thing requires some interpretive framework 
against which they are recognized. Grouping the desires together changes the experiences 
of these desires for me and allows me to see a possible aspect of my self. (Wilkerson 2009, 
p. 105)
This seems intuitively true, but in my view this is not sufficient to justify his meta-
physical conclusion. Let me elaborate: it seems clear that our concepts can make 
a causal contribution to the phenomenology of our experiences. As many philos-
ophers and cognitive scientists have pointed out, applying concepts to the objects 
of our perceptual experiences can change the overall phenomenal qualities of our 
perceptual experiences of those objects (e.g. Pylyshyn 1994; Tye 1995; Carruthers 
2000; Carruthers and Veillet 2011). For instance, the perceptual experience of an 
expert bird-watcher is much richer and full of detail than the perceptual experi-
ence of a beginner. As Peter Carruthers and Benedicte Veillet put it:
[C]oncept acquisition can transform the phenomenology of one’s experience. […] When 
one first takes up birdwatching, for example, one’s experience of the birds one observes 
will be comparatively impoverished. One might only see collections of little grey birds on a 
beach, for instance. But having learned to distinguish knots from plovers from redshanks, 
one sees them as such. […] having acquired the relevant concepts, the differences between 
the birds jump out at one phenomenologically. (Carruthers and Veillet 2011, p. 39)
Likewise, it could be argued that when we conceptualize our experiences and (the 
conscious manifestations of) our sexual desires in one way rather than another, 
that makes a difference to the phenomenology of our global experience. This 
seems correct, but in my view this does not entail that our concepts make a consti-
tutive contribution to the phenomenal qualities of our experiences. As Carruthers 
and Veillet argue, the data here are compatible with the view that our conceptu-
alizations make a causal (rather than constitutive) contribution to the qualities of 
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our experience. For instance, they argue that entertaining and applying certain 
concepts such as the concept of “redshank” rather than the concept of “little grey 
bird” will change our patterns of attention, and this will in turn change the nature 
of our perceptual experiences. They say: “These forms of attention can either be 
overt, in the form of increased numbers of saccades to the relevant features, or 
covert, devoting extra processing to information deriving from the relevant por-
tions of the visual field” (Carruthers and Veillet 2011, p. 39).
In my view, we could extend this line of argument to the case of introspec-
tion, in addition to the case of perception. In particular, it could be argued than 
when I introspect my experiences of sexual arousal and affection for people of 
the same gender, my applying one concept (say, “sexual attraction”) rather than 
another (say, “romantic feelings”) changes the global experience of my introspec-
tion of my feelings. For example, we can imagine the case of a woman who has 
sexual feelings and romantic feelings for women, but she is still unsure about 
how she should describe those feelings. She has several choices: she could focus 
for instance on a property that her feelings for the women she is attracted to, and 
her feelings for her close male friends, have in common, namely, feelings and 
desires of affection, intimacy and closeness. If she chooses to conceptualize her 
feelings for women in virtue of these concepts, then this will probably have an 
impact on the global phenomenology of her experiences, and the significance 
they have for her. On the other hand, she might choose to focus on the proper-
ties that her feelings for a close female friend she’s falling in love with do not 
share with her feelings for her male friends, namely, elements of sexual attraction 
and romantic love. Should we then say that our conceptualizations of our mental 
states determine the nature of those mental states?
I want to answer this question negatively. Drawing from Carruthers and 
Veillet, it could be argued that these interactions between conceptualization and 
global phenomenology can be explained in terms of a causal rather than consti-
tutive contribution of those concepts to the phenomenology of the experience. 
That is to say, choosing to apply one concept rather than the other (even when 
both concepts in principle could be applied correctly since the experiences fall 
under both) changes the nature of our introspective mental state, in the sense 
that those concepts make a causal contribution to the nature of my global experi-
ence (i.e. the introspection of my first-order experiences). That is to say, applying 
one concept rather than another can cause a certain change in my introspective 
experience of my sexual feelings, but this does not entail that applying those 
concepts causes a change in my sexual feelings themselves. This is so because 
applying a certain concept rather than another to my first-order experiences 
could change whether I pay more attention to certain aspects of my experiences 
rather than others, and this will in turn change what it is like for me to introspect 
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those experiences. But crucially, this does not entail the stronger thesis that my 
first-order experiences of arousal and affection are themselves constituted by my 
second-order interpretations of those experiences.
Finally, Wilkerson has offered an additional, related argument for the met-
aphysical conclusion: he first claims that our experiences and desires are not 
intrinsic but rather relational mental states, that is, their nature depends on the 
context, and in particular on other mental states that the subject is having, and he 
then argues that since mental states are relational, this means that the nature of 
one given mental state depends on the nature of other mental states, in the sense 
that the nature of one mental state is not fully determined until it is interpreted. 
For instance, he argues, someone’s sexual desire, say, a desire for someone of 
the same sex, is not fully given independently of other experiences she might be 
having, such as feelings of fear and shame, or feelings of pride and recognition. 
Wilkerson’s claim is that the desires will be experienced very differently, depend-
ing on the context, and therefore the desires themselves will be different, depend-
ing on what other mental states the subject is having.
In response, it is not clear to me that the best way of understanding what is 
going on in this case is in terms of the strong metaphysical claim that Wilkerson 
defends. In particular, it is not clear that these considerations really show that 
sexual desires constitutively depend on other mental states such as beliefs and 
experiences, in the sense that those sexual desires are constituted by those beliefs. 
The following claim seems clearly true: if we change the surrounding beliefs and 
experiences, our experiences of sexual attraction will probably change too. But 
as we saw above, we can understand these cases in terms of a causal rather than 
a constitutive contribution. In particular, we could understand his example in 
terms of mere causal dependence. For example, we can imagine a case of a subject 
who has internalized homophobic attitudes in her environment, and because of 
this, she has feelings of fear and shame regarding her feelings of sexual attrac-
tion and romantic love for women. It seems plausible to assume that these feel-
ings of fear and shame might causally affect which sexual feelings and desires 
she is having. We could also imagine that this subject leaves her homophobic 
worries aside, and comes to have feelings of pride with respect to her feelings 
of attraction for women. It seems likely that these feelings of pride might caus-
ally affect her feelings of sexual attraction themselves, that is, they could become 
more intense or more frequent. This is a case in which other mental states such 
as beliefs and experiences might causally affect the first-order sexual desires that 
constitute sexual orientation themselves, but this is a causal rather than constitu-
tive contribution so this falls short of justifying Wilkerson’s conclusion.
As we saw above, there is another way in which other mental states might 
causally affect my global experience of introspecting my sexual desires, namely, 
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by causally affecting what I pay attention to, or what aspects of my sexual desires 
I focus on (rather than causally affecting those sexual desires themselves). This is 
also a causal rather than constitutive contribution, as we explained. An example 
of this pattern is the following: there could be a subject who has negative beliefs 
about same-sex desire, so that this prevents her from applying the concept “same-
sex sexual desire” to their own sexual desires (which she does have), and this will 
in turn change the global phenomenology of her experiences. But, to repeat, this 
does not entail that those sexual feelings and desires are constituted in part by 
our acts of conceptualizing and classifying them, even if these can be causally 
efficacious in several ways.
5   Concepts of Sexual Orientations and Conceptual 
Choice
In this section I want to further develop an alternative view about the relation 
between sexual desires and our conceptualizations of them, which has been 
hinted at in the previous sections, and in addition I want to consider an objection 
by Wilkerson to a similar view that he has recently discussed and rejected.
He characterizes his opponent’s view as follows:
But surely […] if some people have desires that lead them to adopt one rather than another 
sexual understanding and identity, then these desires have a meaning that could exist inde-
pendently of social circumstances, and interpretation merely amounts to recognizing the 
truth of one’s desires and experiences. (Wilkerson 2013, p. 209).
In response, he argues that his opponent’s notion of interpretation as merely 
describing and classifying our own sexual desires seems to require the presence 
of some basic, “raw” desires that are fully determined prior to our interpretations 
of them, which is counter-intuitive according to Wilkerson. His main objection 
against this view goes as follows:
At issue here is the larger philosophical question of the degree to which our experiences 
constrain the interpretations we make of them and the knowledge we gain from them. Three 
views are possible: our experiences totally constrain (determine, even) the interpretations we 
make of them. I find this view implausible for two reasons. First, it makes little sense to speak 
of determined interpretations since the interpretation of something implies the possibility 
that it could have been interpreted in another way, and second because our interpretations of 
feelings can and do change. Equally implausible is the second view that we can interpret any 
experience in any way. In between, there is the third view that experiences can suggest and 
constrain, without determining, our interpretations of them. (Wilkerson 2013, p. 209)
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In response: I agree that the second view, according to which we can interpret our 
desires in any ways whatsoever, is very implausible. For surely we can imagine 
descriptions of our desires and other mental states that are clearly false. Regard-
ing the first view, which claims that our desires and experiences completely con-
straint and determine the descriptions of them that are apt, I agree that this is 
also implausible, but this is not an accurate characterization of my view, as I will 
explain. And regarding the third view, I agree that the most plausible view lies 
somewhere between the first and the second view, but I disagree with Wilkerson 
concerning the details of this middle position. I will elaborate these points in 
what follows, and this discussion will also lead me to introduce a more developed 
version of my own alternative view about the interaction between interpretation 
and desire.
Regarding the first view that Wilkerson mentions in the quote above, I agree 
that our desires do not fully determine a uniquely correct interpretation of them. 
As I have explained, there can be several interpretations of the same mental 
state, all of which are equally correct, and it is up to us to choose one or another, 
depending on whether it is more useful to employ more inclusive or less inclusive 
concepts, and so on. So the mental states themselves do not determine a unique 
interpretation, independently of our aims and purposes. But this is compatible 
with the view that those mental states have all those properties that we pick out 
with the different concepts independently of our aims and purposes. That is, we 
can reject the first view without endorsing Wilkerson’s stronger claim to the effect 
that those mental states do not fully have those properties until we interpret them. 
The two reasons he gives against the first view do not suffice to motivate this 
stronger metaphysical conclusion. First, the fact that our interpretations of our 
feelings sometimes change does not entail that those feelings are not fully formed 
independently of our interpretations. The interpretations could change because 
for instance we shift the focus of attention without a change in the instantiated 
properties; or we might go from an incorrect interpretation to a correct interpreta-
tion, given additional information or improved recognitional abilities. Moreover, 
the claim that it is possible that a certain feeling could have been interpreted in 
another way is clearly true, but this does not entail that feelings are indetermi-
nate prior to interpretation. As I argued above, our phenomenal tokens instantiate 
many phenomenal types at the same time, and therefore there is a sense in which 
there are several interpretations of them that are possible, since we can concep-
tualize them in different ways (that is, in terms of these different phenomenal 
types). In this way, we always have several options when it comes to interpreting 
our mental states (and this also explains why we can change our interpretations). 
For instance, we might choose between a coarse-grained concept and a more fine-
grained concept. Still, all of this is compatible with the claim that experiences 
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are fully formed prior to interpretation, and to conceptualize them in one way 
rather than another does not change all the phenomenal types they instanti-
ate. Likewise, our desires can be conceptualized in different ways, but this is a 
claim about the possibility of classifying the very same phenomena by means of 
different conceptual schemes that make salient different patterns of similarity. 
Therefore, I agree with the central claim that Wilkerson tries to refute (unsuccess-
fully), to wit: in order to make sense of the way we conceptualize and interpret 
our feelings and desires, we need to postulate a layer of “raw” feelings that are 
fully determined prior to interpretation. This does not mean that our raw feel-
ings fully constrain the way we conceptualize them: we can still choose to apply 
more or less fine-grained concepts, or we can choose among different conceptual 
schemes that emphasize different patterns of similarity.
What about Wilkerson’s third and preferred option? In my view, there is a 
plausible way of reading that option that is exactly the view I have been suggest-
ing here, namely the following: Our sexual desires and feelings can be conceptu-
alized in different ways, that is, according to different concepts and classification 
systems, and the experiences and desires themselves do not fully determine 
which concept or classification system we must use at a certain occasion (since 
there are several conceptual schemes that are equally apt), although the nature of 
those experiences and feelings does put some constraints on the descriptions of 
them that are apt, since those descriptions that ascribe properties that the mental 
states do have will be correct, whereas those descriptions that ascribe properties 
that the mental states do not have will be incorrect. However, this view does not 
entail that the nature of those desires and feelings is not fully determined prior to 
our interpretation.
This alternative view also allows room for choice, but in a different way from 
Wilkerson’s proposal. Our desires themselves are not constituted by choice, 
but our choices regarding which aspects of our experiences and desires we pay 
attention to and which descriptions we focus on will likely affect our global phe-
nomenological state and the significance that those mental states have in our 
life. This element of choice gives rise to an interesting question: what kinds of 
reasons might we have for choosing some descriptions over others? So far I have 
been emphasizing contingent reasons that might make us pay more attention 
to some aspects other than others, such as internalized homophobic beliefs, 
or feelings of fear or pride. I would also like to consider a more “normative” 
version of this issue, that is to say, not just in terms of the question of which 
beliefs and experiences actually affect which descriptions we use, but rather in 
terms of the question of which descriptions we ought to use. There is a new sub-
discipline in philosophy, known as conceptual ethics or conceptual engineering, 
which focuses on normative considerations regarding which concepts and terms 
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we ought to use in order to think and talk.5 These questions do not have to do 
only with choices of words, but also with choices of conceptual or classifica-
tory systems, that is, questions about how we should classify a certain subject 
matter, or which patterns of similarity we should make salient. This is precisely 
the kind of normative question that I am invoking here. When it comes to choos-
ing a description of our experiences and feelings, there can be many factors 
that are relevant with regards to the question of which concepts we should use, 
such as the following: psychological factors having to do with which descrip-
tions might be beneficial or harmful for us, contextual reasons having to do with 
whether the community we are part of is more or less homophobic or more or 
less accepting, and more general moral and political factors having to do with 
which descriptions might be more suitable in order to fight discrimination and 
achieve social justice.
6   Sexual Orientation and Concepts of Gender
There is one final worry I would like to address before concluding my discussion of 
the connection between desire and interpretation. It could be said that the sexual 
feelings and desires that determine someone’s sexual orientation necessarily 
involve certain concepts, since the sexual feelings and desires that are relevant 
for determining someone’s sexual orientation are feelings of desire and attraction 
for people of a certain sex or gender because they are of that sex or gender.6 In 
this way, it could be argued that someone’s sexual orientation depends on which 
concepts are available to that person, since the sexual desires that determine 
her sexual orientation are those that require certain concepts of gender. That is, 
if a person is not able to conceptualize her sexual desires as attraction to men 
and/or women, qua men and/or women, then her sexual desires are not really 
sexual desires for men and/or women qua men and/or women, and therefore they 
cannot determine her sexual orientation.
Does this provide a good argument for the view that someone’s sexual desires 
are in part constituted by their interpretative choices? In my view it does not. 
I agree that the sexual desires that determine someone’s sexual orientation are 
those that somehow involve concepts or representations of the people one is 
5 See Burgess and Plunkett (2013a,b) for a very clear introduction to the main issues in concep-
tual ethics.
6 See Vernallis (2013), Dembroff (2016) and Díaz-León (forthcoming) for further discussion of 
this characterization of sexual orientation.
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attracted to, in virtue of their sex or gender, so one has to be able to represent 
them as being men or women (or some other sex or gender, if we reject the binary 
conception of sex and/or gender). But once someone possesses these concepts 
of sex/gender, and has sexual desires that are appropriately connected to those 
concepts, this is sufficient for the content of those desires to amount to sexual 
attraction for men and/or women, qua men and/or women. It is true that one 
can have these desires only when one possesses those concepts, but this does 
not entail that one can have those desires only when one interprets those very 
desires as being a desire-for-men or desire-for-women. That is to say, according 
to the account of sexual orientation that we are assuming here, what determines 
someone’s sexual orientation is a matter of her sexual desires for men and/or 
women, where the subject needs to conceptualize humans in terms of their sex 
and/or gender. But this does not require the subject to interpret her sexual desires 
themselves as sexual desire for men and/or women. Perhaps if the subject pos-
sesses the concepts of sex and/or gender, as required in order to have a sexual 
orientation, then the subject will automatically classify (most) humans in terms 
of their sex and/or gender, but this does not entail that subjects will automati-
cally classify their own sexual desires as desires for men and/or women. In other 
words, someone’s sexual desires can be fully determined independently of the 
subject’s awareness of them, as I have argued. Therefore, the need for concepts of 
sex and/or gender does not establish Wilkerson’s metaphysical conclusion about 
the nature of sexual desires.
I agree that this conceptual requirement is an interesting claim, and perhaps 
this will have substantial consequences, such as the possible conclusion that 
people in different communities with different or no concepts for sex and/or 
gender would have very different kinds of sexual orientation. But this claim does 
not suffice to motivate the stronger claim that sexual desires are partially consti-
tuted by our interpretations of them.
7   Conclusion
To conclude: Wilkerson has provided a very interesting argument for the claim 
that sexual desires are in part constituted by our choices regarding how to group 
together and classify our desires. However, even if he has presented a compel-
ling description of the phenomenology of coming to know that one is attracted 
to people of the same sex or gender, in my view he has not provided a successful 
argument for the stronger claim that our sexual desires are constituted in part by 
our (freely chosen) acts of classifying and labeling them. Indeed, his description 
of the phenomenology of coming out is also compatible with a more plausible 
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view about the relation between our fully formed sexual desires and the different 
concepts we can use to classify them.
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